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Abstract—For using neural networks in safety critical do-
mains, it is important to know if a decision made by a neural
network is supported by prior similarities in training. We
propose runtime neuron activation pattern monitoring - after the
standard training process, one creates a monitor by feeding the
training data to the network again in order to store the neuron
activation patterns in abstract form. In operation, a classification
decision over an input is further supplemented by examining
if a pattern similar (measured by Hamming distance) to the
generated pattern is contained in the monitor. If the monitor does
not contain any pattern similar to the generated pattern, it raises
a warning that the decision is not based on the training data. Our
experiments show that, by adjusting the similarity-threshold for
activation patterns, the monitors can report a significant portion
of misclassfications to be not supported by training with a small
false-positive rate, when evaluated on a test set.
Index Terms—runtime monitoring, neural network, depend-
ability, autonomous driving
I. INTRODUCTION
For highly automated driving, neural networks are the de
facto option for vision-based perception. Nevertheless, one
fundamental challenge for using neural networks in such a
safety-critical application is to understand if a trained neural
network performs inference “outside its comfort zone”. This
appears when the network needs to significantly extrapolate
from what it learns (or remembers) from the training data, as
similar data has not appeared in the training process.
In this paper, we address this problem by runtime monitor-
ing neuron activation patterns, where the underlying workflow
is illustrated in Figure 1. After completing the training process,
one records the neuron activation patterns for close-to-output
neural network layers for all correctly predicted data used
in the training process. Neurons in close-to-output layers
in general represent high-level features, as demonstrated by
recent approaches in interpreting neural networks [12]. As
state-of-the-art neural networks commonly use ReLU or its
variations as activation function, we select the ReLU on-
off activation pattern to record the presence or absence of
high-level features. At the same time, on-off patterns allow
efficient storage using binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [1].
In operation, a classification decision is supplemented with
a BDD-based monitor to detect whether the provided input
has triggered an unseen neuron activation pattern - whenever
an unseen activation pattern appears, the decision made by
the neural network is considered to be less reliable. For the
example in Figure 1-(b), the scooter is classified as a car,
but as its neuron activation pattern is not among the existing
patterns created from the training data, the monitor reports that
(car, car, car)
(a) Creating a monitor after training phase
(b) Running a monitor in deployment time
(car)
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Fig. 1. High-level workflow on runtime monitoring neuron activation patterns.
the decision made by the neural network can be problematic.
The frequent appearance of unseen patterns provides an indi-
cator of data distribution shift to the development team; such
information is helpful as it may indicate that a neural network
deployed on an autonomous vehicle needs to be updated.
Nevertheless, for such an approach to be useful, we en-
counter technical difficulties where in the created monitor,
the coarseness of abstraction should be abstract enough, but
not too abstract. An illustration can be found in Figure 2,
where given α to be all visited states from the training data,
an abstraction such as α1 allows nearly no generalization
effect, making all encountered data in operation time to be
“not visited”. On the other hand, an abstraction such as α3 is
too coarse in that every observed pattern in operation time is
identified to be “visited”; such a monitor is also not useful.
Overall, we have applied the following techniques to control
the coarseness of abstraction.
(Enlarge the abstraction) Apart from merely including vis-
ited patterns, we further develop technologies to enlarge
the pattern space by considering all neuron activation
patterns whose Hamming distance with existing patterns
are within a certain threshold. It can also be efficiently im-
plemented using existential quantification as commonly
seen in many BDD software packages. Adding additional
patterns does not influence performance - the membership
query during runtime remains in the worst case in time
linear to the number of neurons in the monitored layer
(due to the use of BDDs). In addition, we apply gradient-
based sensitivity analysis [9] to only monitor important
neurons, thereby allowing unmonitored neurons to hold
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Fig. 2. Finding “just-right” abstraction for runtime monitors
arbitrary values in the abstraction. This also overcomes
the limitation where the maximum number of BDD
variables one can use in practice is around hundreds.
(Infer when to stop enlarging) To ensure that the abstrac-
tion is not too coarse, we take a validation set (which is
expected to have the same distribution as in operation,
but with ground-truth labels) and gradually increase the
Hamming distance such that in the created region of
abstraction, whenever the occurrence of out-of-pattern
scenarios appears, it is also likely that misclassification
appears. We applied this concept to decide the coarseness
of abstraction for classifying standard image benchmarks
such as MNIST [5] German Traffic Sign Recognition
Benchmark (GTSRB) [10], as well as a vision-based
front-car detector for automated highway piloting.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
describes how to build neuron activation pattern monitors
with the use of BDDs. Section III gives examples in terms
of controlling the coarseness of abstraction. We summarize
related work in Section IV and conclude in Section V with
further research directions.
II. BUILDING NEURON ACTIVATION PATTERN MONITORS
We describe the underlying principles of our runtime mon-
itoring approach for neural networks. For simplicity, the
presented algorithm is for image classification, and we focus
on runtime monitoring fully-connected neural network layers.
Monitoring convolutional layers can be achieved by treating
layers having convolutional filters as layers with fully con-
nected neurons where missing connections are assigned with
zero weights.
A neural network is comprised of L layers where opera-
tionally, the l-th layer for l ∈ {1, . . . , L} of the network is
a function g(l) : Rdl−1 → Rdl , with dl being the dimension
of layer l. Given an input in ∈ Rd0 , the output of the l-th
layer of the neural network f (l) is given by the functional
composition of the l-th layer and previous layers f (l)(in) :=
◦(l)i=1g(i)(in) = g(l)(. . . g(2)(g(1)(in))). For a neural network
classifying C categories dL = C. Given the computed output
f (L)(in) = (v1, . . . , vC), the decision decf(L)(in) of classify-
ing input in to a certain class is based on choosing the index i
with the maximum value vi among elements in the output
vector, i.e., decf(L)(in) := argmaxi∈{1,...,C}{v1, . . . , vC}.
An important case in modern neural networks is the use
of layers implementing Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU), where
the corresponding function g(l) maintains the input dimension
and transforms an input vector element-wise by keeping its
positive part, i.e., g(l)(v1, . . . , vdl−1) := (v
′
1, . . . , v
′
dl−1) where
v′i := max(0, vi) for i ∈ {1, . . . , dl−1}.
By interpreting an input element vi to the ReLU layer as
feature intensity, if vi has value greater than zero, then it
is considered to be activated, while vi having value less or
equal to zero is considered to be suppressed by ReLU. With
this intuition in mind, our definition of a neuron activation
pattern is based on capturing the activation and suppression
of features.
Definition 1 (Neuron activation pattern): Given a neu-
ral network with input in and the l-th layer being ReLU,
pat(f (l)(in)), the neuron activation pattern at layer l, is defined
as follows:
pat(f (l)(in)) := (prelu(v1), . . . , prelu(vdl))
where (v1, . . . , vdl) = f
(l)(in) is the output from layer l, and
prelu : R→ {0,1} captures the activation cases:
prelu(x) =
{
1 x > 0
0 otherwise
Let T denote the set of training inputs and let Tc ⊆ T
denote the set of all training images labelled as class c based on
the ground truth. For each class c, we define the corresponding
“comfort zone” for a neural network to be the set of activation
patterns visited for all correctly classified training images,
together with other neuron activation patterns that are close
(via Hamming distance) to visited patterns.
Definition 2 (γ-comfort zone): Given a neural network and
its training set T , the γ-comfort zone Zγc ⊆ {0,1}dl for
classifying class c, under the condition where the l-th layer
is ReLU, is defined recursively as follows:
Zγc :=

{pat(f (l)(in)) | in ∈ Tc ∧ decf(L)(in) = c}, if γ = 0
Zγ−1c ∪ {p |p ∈ {0,1}dl∧
∃p’ ∈ Zγ−1c : H(p,p’) = 1}, if γ > 0
where H(p, p′) is the function to compute the Hamming
distance between two pattern vectors p,p′ ∈ {0, 1}dl .
Lastly, a neuron activation pattern monitor stores the com-
puted comfort zone for each class using the training data.
Definition 3 (Neural activation pattern monitor): Given
a neural network for classifying C classes, its training set
and a user-specified γ, its neuron activation pattern monitor is
defined as 〈Zγ1 , . . . ,ZγC〉.
Note that as Zγc ⊆ {0,1}dl , the construction of Zγc can
be done using binary decision diagrams with dl variables.
Algorithm 1 describes how to construct such a monitor, where
bdd.emptySet, bdd.or, and bdd.encode are functions used
to create an empty set, to perform set union, and to encode an
activation pattern into BDDs. The function bdd.exists(j, set)
performs the existential quantification on set over the j-th
variable.
In Algorithm 1, lines 4 to 8 record all visited patterns to
form Z0c . Subsequently, lines 9 to 14 build Zic from Zi−1c . In
Input: neural network and l-th layer to monitor, training
set T , user specified γ
Output: runtime activation pattern monitor 〈Zγ1 , . . . ,ZγC〉
/* initialize monitors as empty BDDs */
1 for c ∈ C do
2 Z0c ← bdd.emptySet()
3 end
/* iterate all images */
4 for in ∈ T do
/* check if prediction is correct */
5 if decf(L)(in) = c ∧ in ∈ Tc then
/* add activation pattern to the
corresponding BDD */
6 Z0c ← bdd.or(Z0c ,bdd.encode(pat(f (l)(in))))
7 end
8 end
9 for c = 1, . . . , C, i = 1, . . . , γ do
Zic ← bdd.emptySet();
10 for c = 1, . . . , C do
11 for i = 1, . . . , γ do
12 for j = 1, . . . , dl do
Zic ← bdd.or(Zic,bdd.exists(j,Zi−1c )) ;
13 end
14 end
15 return 〈Zγ1 , . . . ,ZγC〉
Algorithm 1: Building a neuron activation pattern monitor
after training
particular, computing the enlarged Zγc from Zγ−1c can be effi-
ciently achieved using the existential quantification operation
as listed in line 12. Consider an example where Z0c = {001},
then the operation bdd.exists(j,Z0c ), for j = 1, 2, 3, creates
{-01}, {0-1}, {00-} respectively. The union over existentially
quantified result creates an enlarged set containing additional
patterns with Hamming distance equal to 1.
(Neuron selection via gradient analysis) For layers with large
neuron amounts, as the use of BDD has practical variable
limits around 200, one extension is to only monitor the
activation patterns over a subset of neurons that are important
for the classification decision. One way of selecting neurons
to be monitored is to apply gradient-based sensitivity analysis
similar to the work of saliency map [9]. The underlying
principle is that for the output of neuron ni over neuron nc
producing output class c, one computes ∂nc∂ni . Subsequently,
one only selects neuron ni if |∂nc∂ni | is large, as the change
of value ni significantly influences the output c due to the
derivative term.
As a special case, if one monitors patterns over the neuron
layer immediately before the output layer, and there is no non-
linear activation in the output layer (which is commonly seen
in practice), ∂nc∂ni is simply the weight connecting ni to nc.
III. CONTROLLING THE ABSTRACTION
As stated in the introduction, the coarseness of abstraction
should be carefully designed to make the resulting monitor
useful. Both the number of neurons being monitored and
the value γ are hyper-parameters to control the coarseness
ID Classifier Model architecture Accuracy
(train/validation)
1 MNIST ReLU(Conv(40)), MaxPool,
ReLU(Conv(20)), MaxPool,
ReLU(fc(320)), ReLU(fc(160)),
ReLU(fc(80)), ReLU(fc(40)),
fc(10)
99.34%,
98.81%
2 GTSRB ReLU(BN(Conv(40))), MaxPool,
ReLU(BN(Conv(20))), MaxPool,
ReLU(fc(240)), ReLU(fc(84)),
fc(43)
99.98%,
96.73%
TABLE I
ARCHITECTURES AND ACCURACIES OF THE NETWORKS USED IN THE
EXPERIMENT. CONVOLUTIONAL LAYERS (CONV) HAVE KERNEL SIZE
(5, 5) AND STRIDE (1, 1). WE USE 2× 2 MAX POOLING LAYERS
(MAXPOOL). FULLY-CONNECTED LAYERS AND BATCH NORMALIZATION
ARE DENOTED BY fc(·) AND BN(·). THE LAYER BEING MONITORED IS
HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD TEXT.
ID misclassification
rate
γ #out-of-pattern images
#total images
#out-of-pattern misclassified images
#out-of-pattern images
1 1.19%
0 7.66% 10.70%
1 2.01% 21.89%
2 0.6% 31.66%
2 3.27%
0 32.92% 10.13%
1 15.0% 19.44%
2 7.08% 41.17%
3 4.58% 54.54%
TABLE II
RESULTS OF APPLYING RUNTIME NEURON ACTIVATION MONITORING
of abstraction. We have implemented the concept to examine
the effect of different γ using the PyTorch machine learning
framework1 and the python-based BDD package dd2.
Based on two publicly available image classification
datasets MNIST [5] and GTSRB [10], we trained two neural
networks. The architectures of the networks are summarized
in Table I. After training, we build the runtime monitors based
on Algorithm 1. For network 2, in the experiment we (i) only
construct the monitor for the stop sign (c = 14) and (ii) out
of 84 neurons in a layer, only 25% are monitored based on
gradient-based analysis. We have gradually increased γ and
recorded the rate of out-of-pattern images for all validation
images, as well as the portion of misclassified images within
out-of-pattern images.
For network 1 classifying MNIST, the rates of
#out-of-pattern images
#total images for all γ ∈ {0, 1, 2} are all relatively
small. For network 2 classifying GTSRB, one can argue that
the abstraction using γ = 0 is not coarse enough, as the
network has a low mis-classification rate (around 3.27%) but
the monitor reports that around 32.92% of the images create
patterns that are not included in the monitor.
(MNIST with γ = 2) If there is no distributional shift in
operation, the monitor will not signal problems in 99.4%
(100% − 0.6%) of its overall operation time, implying
that it is largely silent. Nevertheless, whenever it signals
an issue of unseen patterns, apart from arguing that the
network is making a decision without prior similarities,
1Pytorch: https://pytorch.org/
2dd: https://pypi.org/project/dd/
one may even argue that there is a non-neglectable
probability of 31.66% where the decision being made by
the network is problematic3, although the neural network
may still report that the input is classified to the class
with a high probability.
(GTSRB with γ = 3) If there is no distributional shift in
operation, the monitor will not signal problem in 95.42%
(100%−4.58%) of its operating time. Whenever it signals
an issue of unseen patterns, there is a non-neglectable
probability of 54.54% where it is indeed misclassified.
(Case Study) We also experimented the runtime monitoring
technique on a vision-based front-car detection system for
highway piloting. The vision subsystem (cf. Figure 3) contains
three components: (1) vehicle detection, (2) lane detection,
and (3) front-car selection. The front-car selection unit is
implemented using a neural network-based classifier, which
takes the lane information and the bounding box of vehicles,
and produces either an index of the bounding vehicle or a
special class “]” for which no forward vehicle is considered
to be a front car.
IV. RELATED WORK
Using neural networks in safety critical applications has
raised needs for creating dependability claims. Recent results
in compile-time formal verification techniques such as RuLU-
plex [4] or Planet [2] use constraint solving to examine if
for all inputs within a bounded polyhedron, it is possible
for the network to generate undersired outputs. These tech-
niques are used when a risk property is provided by domain
experts beforehand, and they are only limited to piecewise
linear networks with a few number of neurons. Our work of
neuron monitoring is more related to the concept of runtime
verification [6], which examines if a runtime trace has violated
a given property. The generalizability condition, as defined by
the γ-comfort zone created after training, can be understood
as a safety property. To the best of our knowledge, we are
unaware of any work in runtime verification that considers the
problem of generalizability monitoring of neural networks. In
terms of scalability, our framework also allows taking arbitrary
large networks with other nonlinear activation functions, so
long as the neurons being monitored are ReLU.
Lastly, within machine learning (ML), the work of filtering
adversarial attacks [3], [11] reply on creating another ML
component to perform detection (thus preventing the network
from making wrong decisions). Our proposed method dif-
fers from these ML-based approach in that the sound over-
approximation of the visited inputs implies that if the monitor
reports the occurrence of an unseen pattern, the occurrence is
always genuine. The sure guarantee (in contrast to concepts
such as almost-sure4 which is the best one can derive with
statistical machine learning methods) makes the certification
of such a monitor in the safety domain relatively easier. In
3The argument is based on an assumption where no distributional shift
implies that #out-of-pattern misclassified images
#out-of-pattern images remains the same in validation and
in operation.
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almost surely
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Fig. 3. High-level architecture of a front-car detection unit for a highway
piloting system.
particular within the domain of autonomous driving, it is
highly likely that the test set used in engineering time will
deviate from the real world data (the black swan effect),
making any probabilistic claim hard to be certified.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we proposed neuron activation pattern mon-
itoring as a method to detect if a decision made by a neural
network is not supported by prior similarities in training.
We envision that a neuron activation pattern monitor can be
served as a medium to assist the sensor fusion process on the
architecture level, as a decision made by the network may
not be fully trusted due to no ground-truth being offered in
operation time.
The established connection between formal methods and
machine learning also reveals several possible extension
schemes. (1) The technique shall be directly applicable on ob-
ject detection networks such as YOLO [8], whose underlying
principle is to partition an image to a finite grid, with each cell
in the grid offering object proposals. (2) We are also studying
the feasibility on more refined domains using tools such as
difference bound matrices [7], in order to better capture an
abstract representation of the visited activation patterns.
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